P003 Enclosure PUFs

Can an enclosure-scale hardware fingerprint (PUF) hold a stable key across years of thermal cycling and vibration while resisting probing attacks?

Enclosure-scale PUFs: stability, key generation, probing attacks.

Terms: PUF (physically unclonable function): a unique, hard-to-copy hardware fingerprint from manufacturing variations; here measured across a whole enclosure to generate a key.

Status

Started Batteryless flexPCB mesh cover deriving a PUF key for a multi-chip PCB embedded system, aiming at FIPS 140-2 Level 3: statistics over 115 covers, physical attacks, and a -20 to +60 C chamber test on one board with three covers plus accelerated ageing of foils. Not accelerator scale or 700–1,200 W, no vibration test, and multi-year key stability not shown (the authors suggest re-enrolling in the field), so the headline's years-of-cycling clause is open; probing resistance is argued by design (keys not reachable without destroying the PUF) rather than tested against microprobing. Kulp et al. (2024) report the demonstration second-hand; the stability question is posed as open by Harack et al. (2025) and the RAND PUF-enclosures RFD.

We demonstrate the feasibility of our concept … Practical results including statistics over a set of 115 flexPCB covers, physical attacks, and environmental testing support our design rationale.
Immler, Obermaier, Ng, Ke, Lee, Lim, Oh, Wee & Sigl (2019), Secure Physical Enclosures from Covers with Tamper-Resistance (IACR TCHES) (2019), L30–33

Posed by

Also raised in: Petrie & Aarne (2025), Technical Options for Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees (flexHEG Part 2); Kulp et al. (2024), Hardware-Enabled Governance Mechanisms (RAND WR-A3056-1); AI Security Forum, Requests for Discussion.

Sub-questions

IDSub-questionWhat the sources report
P003.1Does an enclosure PUF keep a stable key through 5–10 years of thermal cycling and vibration at 700–1,200 W (bit-error drift)?open
P003.2Has a tamper-evident enclosure PUF been demonstrated at accelerator-board/module scale with reported key-reproduction error and tamper-detection rates?partly answered
P003.3What is the key-generation time of an enclosure-scale PUF?open
P003.4Has PUF-derived key material been extracted by microprobing / laser voltage probing from a protected design?open

Sub-questions not yet stated precisely enough to check

IDSub-question
P003.5Can PUF-based disablement survive a single leaked copy of firmware that then scales to all chips?

Possibly relevant work found by automated search

Found by AI agents searching for this problem's sub-questions, mostly by keyword and citation in the OpenAlex scholarly database and on the web; a second AI pass reviewed each one, and we spot-checked some by hand. They seemed reasonably related, as far as one can tell from outside each paper's field. Some come from neighbouring fields, such as arms control and financial audit, and bear on the problem by analogy. Not reviewed against the status above; a paper listed here does not change that status. 928 of 1052 quotes checked word for word against the paper's text.

For P003.1: Does an enclosure PUF keep a stable key through 5–10 years of thermal cycling and vibration at 700–1,200 W (bit-error drift)?

For P003.2: Has a tamper-evident enclosure PUF been demonstrated at accelerator-board/module scale with reported key-reproduction error and tamper-detection rates?

For P003.4: Has PUF-derived key material been extracted by microprobing / laser voltage probing from a protected design?

Data