P004 Package- and board-level tamper detection

Can non-destructive inspection detect package- or board-level tampering - circuit edits, re-encapsulation, added components - at a stated detection and false-alarm rate?

Non-destructive detection of package- and board-level tampering.

Terms: FIB (focused ion beam): a lab tool that can cut and rewire a chip to insert edits. PDN (power distribution network): the network that carries power from the board's voltage regulator to the chip's transistors; a change in its electrical impedance can signal tampering. W D (WD): the Wasserstein distance, the paper's measure of how far a board's measured impedance has moved from its untampered reference.

Status

Started Non-destructive, measured on hardware: an on-FPGA network analyser reads the board's power-delivery-network impedance and flags an added shunt resistor, removed decoupling capacitors, a nearby EM probe and a polished package on commercial FPGA development boards, one board per tamper event, with a global threshold that gave no false alarms on the authors' own measurements. Not a detection and false-alarm rate across devices; not a data-centre GPU board; circuit edits inside the package (FIB) and re-encapsulation are not covered. Related held work: BackMon (Mosavirik & Tajik 2024) detects removal of the cooling stack exposing a flip-chip die backside, one board, no error rates; Safa et al. 2023 use VNA impedance signatures to spot aged chips. The headline is not answered within a stated scope.

The magnitude of the WD metric shows that all tamper events performed in this paper can be distinguished if we use the sensor at the right frequency. Moreover, the detection thresholds for different tamper events, and their corresponding frequency bands, can be selected differently. However, we still can define a global threshold at W D = 3 for the tampering experiments presented in this work without causing any false alarms.
Mosavirik, Schaumont & Tajik (2022), ImpedanceVerif: On-Chip Impedance Sensing for System-Level Tampering Detection (IACR TCHES 2023, no. 1) (2022), L829–833

Posed by

Also raised in: Aarne, Fist & Withers (2024), Secure, Governable Chips (CNAS); Ansari (2026), Hardware-Level Governance of AI Compute: A Feasibility Taxonomy for Regulatory Compliance and Treaty Verification; Kulp et al. (2024), Hardware-Enabled Governance Mechanisms (RAND WR-A3056-1).

Sub-questions

IDSub-questionWhat the sources report
P004.1Does a FIB edit to a security block leave evidence detectable by non-destructive inspection?implied by a source, not stated as open
P004.2Can an inspector detect non-destructively that a GPU's heat sink was removed and refitted (exposing the flip-chip backside)?implied by a source, not stated as open
P004.3Can lab methods (e.g. ToF-SIMS for acid residue) detect a decapsulated, FIB-edited and re-encapsulated die, at what detection rate?a source suggests an answer (not checked)
P004.4Is any commercial backside-tamper detection available for AI accelerators?open
P004.5Is PDN-impedance tamper sensing present or retrofittable on any shipping data-centre GPU?partly answered
P004.6Does probe-signal injection detect a hardware modification on a populated server board, with detection and false-alarm rates?open
P004.7Has a power-manipulation-detect fuse been shown to trip reliably under glitching with a low false-positive rate?open

Possibly relevant work found by automated search

Found by AI agents searching for this problem's sub-questions, mostly by keyword and citation in the OpenAlex scholarly database and on the web; a second AI pass reviewed each one, and we spot-checked some by hand. They seemed reasonably related, as far as one can tell from outside each paper's field. Some come from neighbouring fields, such as arms control and financial audit, and bear on the problem by analogy. Not reviewed against the status above; a paper listed here does not change that status. 928 of 1052 quotes checked word for word against the paper's text.

For P004.1: Does a FIB edit to a security block leave evidence detectable by non-destructive inspection?

For P004.2: Can an inspector detect non-destructively that a GPU's heat sink was removed and refitted (exposing the flip-chip backside)?

For P004.3: Can lab methods (e.g. ToF-SIMS for acid residue) detect a decapsulated, FIB-edited and re-encapsulated die, at what detection rate?

For P004.5: Is PDN-impedance tamper sensing present or retrofittable on any shipping data-centre GPU?

For P004.6: Does probe-signal injection detect a hardware modification on a populated server board, with detection and false-alarm rates?

For P004.7: Has a power-manipulation-detect fuse been shown to trip reliably under glitching with a low false-positive rate?

* Full text not reviewed; more likely to contain errors.

Data