P008 Chain of custody from fab to packaging
Can a custody scheme detect a wafer or die that goes missing or is swapped between fab and packaging, and identify who last held it?
Die-level identity and records (ECID, tamper-evident die-ID commitments, tool-signed process records) plus sealed transport, detecting a missing or substituted die between fab and packaging.
Terms: ECID (electronic chip ID): a unique serial number burned into each die, readable electronically over the IEEE 1149.1 (JTAG) test interface. Merkle root: a single short fingerprint summarising a whole set of records, so any later change to any record is detectable.
Status
Analyzed A proposed custody principle only: verifiable transport at each step from fab through dicing and packaging, with liability on the last holder; no mechanism, miss rate or test. Cankaya (2025) describes signed ECID handoffs second-hand from Zhang & Guin (2019), which is not held, and leaves 'who last had custody' for a later post; Scher & Thiergart list CISA-style chain-of-custody documentation as a building block. Nothing deployed for an AI-accelerator supply chain.
it is important for the wafers (and later the dies) to be securely and verifiably transported at each step. If these chip precursors ever go missing, responsibility for the violation would lie with the most recent holder.
Raised in: Scher & Thiergart (2024), Mechanisms to Verify International Agreements About AI Development (MIRI); Shavit (2023), What Does It Take to Catch a Chinchilla? Verifying Rules on Large-Scale Neural Network Training via Compute Monitoring; Ilhan, Withers, Gietz & Harack (2026), Verifiable Semiconductor Manufacturing (Oxford AIGI); Cankaya (2025), TSMC Most Definitely Has a Golden Record of All AI Chips It Made.
Sub-questions
| ID | Sub-question | What the sources report |
|---|---|---|
| P008.1 | Has a fab published a tamper-evident commitment (e.g. Merkle root) over its die-ID records, and can it resist insider alteration or a record fraudulent from the start? | open |
| P008.2 | Do H100/B200/TPU dies carry an IEEE 1149.1 ECID, and can it be read on deployed HGX/NVL72 boards without disassembly? | implied by a source, not stated as open |
| P008.3 | Is there a custody scheme (die IDs + sealed transport) that detects a missing or substituted wafer/die/component between fab and packaging with a stated miss rate? | open |
| P008.4 | Has ECID-signed custody handoff been deployed for an AI-accelerator supply chain, and can it identify the last custodian for a stated fraction of diverted test units? | partly answered |
| P008.5 | Can fab tools sign process records bound to a die ID that a third party verifies without seeing proprietary process data? | open |
Possibly relevant work found by automated search
Found by AI agents searching for this problem's sub-questions, mostly by keyword and citation in the OpenAlex scholarly database and on the web; a second AI pass reviewed each one, and we spot-checked some by hand. They seemed reasonably related, as far as one can tell from outside each paper's field. Some come from neighbouring fields, such as arms control and financial audit, and bear on the problem by analogy. Not reviewed against the status above; a paper listed here does not change that status. 928 of 1052 quotes checked word for word against the paper's text.
For P008.3: Is there a custody scheme (die IDs + sealed transport) that detects a missing or substituted wafer/die/component between fab and packaging with a stated miss rate?
For P008.5: Can fab tools sign process records bound to a die ID that a third party verifies without seeing proprietary process data?
* Full text not reviewed; more likely to contain errors.
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