P012 Physical inspection capability and cost

What is the per-die cost, time and miss rate of destructive and non-destructive die inspection, and how many chips must be inspected to catch an inserted trojan with high confidence?

Capability, cost and sampling statistics of physical die inspection.

Terms: q: the fraction of chips that carry a hardware trojan.

Status

Analyzed A desk analysis of the sampling clause: inspection cost and sample size against Trojan prevalence, with the observation that sampling 1% of chips may cost more than producing all chips unverified; Aarne & Petrie (2025, flexHEG Part 3) give the same arithmetic for a 1/1000 sampling rate (63% chance of catching a 1,000-device compromised batch). No held document measures per-die cost, time or miss rate of destructive or non-destructive inspection at an advanced node: Harack et al. (2025) state no non-destructive technique is known for a chip with tens of billions of transistors, and Ilhan et al. call inspection 'extremely expensive, slow, and often destructive' without numbers. Cross-references, not evidence for this headline: Agrawal et al. (2007) simulate side-channel screening (no silicon); Thummala et al. (2026) measure a power side-channel screen on one Atmel microcontroller (93.2% of tampered-firmware traces flagged at 1% false positives), firmware tampering rather than die modification.

If only 1 chip in 100,000 is compromised, many thousands must be tested to achieve high confidence of detection. The sampling regime can be tuned based on acceptable risk (e.g., testing 1% of chips vs 0.01%), but this involves significant cost considerations.
Ilhan, Withers, Gietz & Harack (2026), Verifiable Semiconductor Manufacturing (Oxford AIGI) (2026), L689–692

Posed by

Also raised in: Harack et al. (2025), Verification for International AI Governance (Oxford AIGI); Ilhan, Withers, Gietz & Harack (2026), Verifiable Semiconductor Manufacturing (Oxford AIGI); Cankaya (2026), A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification (v0.2); Proofworks, Living Verification Documents.

Sub-questions

IDSub-questionWhat the sources report
P012.1What is the most complex logic die recovered by delayering and imaging, and what wall-clock time and cost per die (destructive vs non-destructive) at an advanced node?open
P012.2What is the per-die cost and miss rate of SEM/FIB imaging for a single rogue via at an advanced node?open
P012.3What is the most advanced node and layer count at which full-die non-destructive imaging (e.g. ptychographic X-ray laminography) has been published?a source suggests an answer (not checked)
P012.4Can non-destructive X-ray imaging resolve buried interconnects in a CoWoS/SoIC-class package at rogue-via resolution?open
P012.5At trojan prevalence q (e.g. 1-in-100,000), how many chips must be inspected for a stated detection probability, and when does that cost exceed producing all chips unverified?open
P012.6Has any inspection method (e.g. dopant-contrast imaging) detected a dopant-level trojan in a blind test?implied by a source, not stated as open
P012.7Has side-channel IC fingerprinting been demonstrated on a large-transistor AI accelerator die, at what per-unit cost and false-negative rate as a supply-chain screening tier?partly answered
P012.8Can IRIS imaging detect an inserted comparator trojan on a leading-edge die?open

Possibly relevant work found by automated search

Found by AI agents searching for this problem's sub-questions, mostly by keyword and citation in the OpenAlex scholarly database and on the web; a second AI pass reviewed each one, and we spot-checked some by hand. They seemed reasonably related, as far as one can tell from outside each paper's field. Some come from neighbouring fields, such as arms control and financial audit, and bear on the problem by analogy. Not reviewed against the status above; a paper listed here does not change that status. 928 of 1052 quotes checked word for word against the paper's text.

For P012.1: What is the most complex logic die recovered by delayering and imaging, and what wall-clock time and cost per die (destructive vs non-destructive) at an advanced node?

For P012.3: What is the most advanced node and layer count at which full-die non-destructive imaging (e.g. ptychographic X-ray laminography) has been published?

For P012.4: Can non-destructive X-ray imaging resolve buried interconnects in a CoWoS/SoIC-class package at rogue-via resolution?

For P012.6: Has any inspection method (e.g. dopant-contrast imaging) detected a dopant-level trojan in a blind test?

For P012.8: Can IRIS imaging detect an inserted comparator trojan on a leading-edge die?

* Full text not reviewed; more likely to contain errors.

Data