P021 Trustworthiness and leakage of monitoring sensors and data

Can facility sensors be built that both parties trust — verifier trusts the readings, prover trusts they do not exfiltrate — with a quantified leak bound?

Whether facility sensors and their data can be trusted and leak little.

Status

Started Leakage of verifier-facing releases derived from real physical measurements (H100 and B200 node power traces, RAPL power traces, GPU electromagnetic traces, measured workload profiles) over six verification tasks, measured as conditional mutual information: this covers the prover's quantified leak bound for what the verifier receives. The verifier-trusts-the-readings clause is out of scope ('MID does not make a compromised evidence source honest'); exfiltration by the sensor hardware itself (bits per second per channel) and a mutually trusted sensor: nothing built; Harack's prover-side mitigations are paper only.

Across these tasks, MID produces three releases with perfect held-out verification and zero measured collateral leakage, while the remaining tasks yield explicit privacy–utility frontiers.
Abdelghafar & Kulp (2026), Privacy-Preserving AI Verification via Minimal Information Disclosure (arXiv 2608.02774v1) (2026-08-03), L22–24

Posed by

Also raised in: Aarne & Petrie (2025), International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees (flexHEG Part 3); Abdelghafar & Kulp (2026), Privacy-Preserving AI Verification via Minimal Information Disclosure; Proofworks, Living Verification Documents.

Sub-questions

IDSub-questionWhat the sources report
P021.1Has a facility sensor suite been threat-modelled with a quantified leak bound (bits/s) per channel, showing sensors cannot exfiltrate or sabotage?open
P021.2Can workload type be inferred from rack video (LEDs, fan speed) above chance?open
P021.3Given a sensor's time resolution and a verifier-triggered external pulse, what location error (km) results, and what time-coarsening defeats triangulation?open
P021.4Does aggregated or allocation-level facility power data leak computation details beyond what is declared?open
P021.5Has a privacy-preserving protocol (MPC, confidential computing, statistical) been demonstrated that checks a declared grid load list against verifier estimates and bounds undeclared MW without revealing load profiles?open

Sub-questions not yet stated precisely enough to check

IDSub-question
P021.6Can analog sensors be built that both parties trust (verifier trusts readings; prover trusts no leakage)?
P021.7How are monitoring systems that must themselves be air-gapped in turn monitored?
P021.8Should AI infrastructure be kept away from sensitive military assets to limit what monitoring reveals?

Possibly relevant work found by automated search

Found by AI agents searching for this problem's sub-questions, mostly by keyword and citation in the OpenAlex scholarly database and on the web; a second AI pass reviewed each one, and we spot-checked some by hand. They seemed reasonably related, as far as one can tell from outside each paper's field. Some come from neighbouring fields, such as arms control and financial audit, and bear on the problem by analogy. Not reviewed against the status above; a paper listed here does not change that status. 928 of 1052 quotes checked word for word against the paper's text.

For P021.1: Has a facility sensor suite been threat-modelled with a quantified leak bound (bits/s) per channel, showing sensors cannot exfiltrate or sabotage?

For P021.2: Can workload type be inferred from rack video (LEDs, fan speed) above chance?

For P021.3: Given a sensor's time resolution and a verifier-triggered external pulse, what location error (km) results, and what time-coarsening defeats triangulation?

For P021.4: Does aggregated or allocation-level facility power data leak computation details beyond what is declared?

For P021.5: Has a privacy-preserving protocol (MPC, confidential computing, statistical) been demonstrated that checks a declared grid load list against verifier estimates and bounds undeclared MW without revealing load profiles?

For P021.6: Can analog sensors be built that both parties trust (verifier trusts readings; prover trusts no leakage)?

Data