P037 Encrypted traffic and taps

Can a tap verify encrypted inter-accelerator traffic through confined key disclosure, and at what security trade-off and throughput cost?

Taps versus encrypted interconnect traffic.

Terms: encrypted interconnect traffic (TEE/CC): data sent between accelerators encrypted by a trusted execution environment or confidential-computing feature. confined key disclosure: giving a tap just enough key material to check traffic without exposing everything.

Status

Analyzed Desk analysis of key disclosure for tapped encrypted traffic: where encryption runs outside a trusted execution environment the prover can retain session keys and share them after sessions expire; for TEE-encrypted fabrics post-hoc decryption is called fundamentally difficult and an active man-in-the-middle tap is sketched as a possible workaround with unestimated overhead; the security trade-off is argued (taps as a substitute for TEE isolation against a malicious operator), not tested. Throughput cost of any such tap: no work. Security Level 5 encrypted-traffic cruxes were found at a workshop and not resolved.

This means that for non-TEE encrypted fabrics, the operator (i.e., the prover) can retain keys to enable post-hoc decryption of tapped ciphertext. Encryption alone does not foreclose verification.
Cankaya (2026), Research Note: The Fundamentals and Feasibility of Secure Network Taps for Verifying AI Datacenter Use (Substack), appendix D encrypted traffic (2026-04-30 (live page read 2026-10-21)), L348

Posed by

Also raised in: Cankaya (2026), All Hands on Deck to Build the Datacenter Lie Detector; Cankaya (2026), Research Note: The Fundamentals and Feasibility of Secure Network Taps for Verifying AI Datacenter Use.

Sub-questions

IDSub-questionWhat the sources report
P037.1Can a tap verify Confidential-Computing / TEE-encrypted inter-accelerator traffic via key disclosure confined to prover-overseen chips, without an unacceptable security trade-off?open
P037.2What fraction of frontier compute will run TEE-encrypted interconnects by 2027?open
P037.3What throughput overhead does an active man-in-the-middle tap impose on TEE-encrypted RDMA (post-hoc decryption being fundamentally hard)?open
P037.4Can a tap-based verification protocol satisfy Security Level 5 encrypted-traffic controls as written?open

Possibly relevant work found by automated search

Found by AI agents searching for this problem's sub-questions, mostly by keyword and citation in the OpenAlex scholarly database and on the web; a second AI pass reviewed each one, and we spot-checked some by hand. They seemed reasonably related, as far as one can tell from outside each paper's field. Some come from neighbouring fields, such as arms control and financial audit, and bear on the problem by analogy. Not reviewed against the status above; a paper listed here does not change that status. 928 of 1052 quotes checked word for word against the paper's text.

For P037.1: Can a tap verify Confidential-Computing / TEE-encrypted inter-accelerator traffic via key disclosure confined to prover-overseen chips, without an unacceptable security trade-off?

For P037.3: What throughput overhead does an active man-in-the-middle tap impose on TEE-encrypted RDMA (post-hoc decryption being fundamentally hard)?

Data