P055 Keys and hardware roots of trust

What lab cost and time are needed to extract an accelerator's device/attestation key, and can keys be provisioned so neither party holds a copy?

Extraction resistance and provisioning of device keys and roots of trust.

Terms: root of trust (RoT): a small, highly trusted hardware component that the rest of a system's security is built on. HSM (hardware security module): a tamper-resistant device that stores and uses cryptographic keys. Caliptra, OpenTitan: open hardware root-of-trust designs.

Status

Posed

Posed by

Also raised in: Baker, Kulp, Marks, Brundage & Heim (2025), Verifying International Agreements on AI: Six Layers of Verification for Rules on Large-Scale AI Development and Deployment (RAND WR-A4077-1); Scher & Thiergart (2024), Mechanisms to Verify International Agreements About AI Development (MIRI); Petrie, Aarne, Ammann & Dalrymple (2025), Overview of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees (flexHEG Part 1); Petrie & Aarne (2025), Technical Options for Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees (flexHEG Part 2); Aarne & Petrie (2025), International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees (flexHEG Part 3); Aarne, Fist & Withers (2024), Secure, Governable Chips (CNAS); Shavit (2023), What Does It Take to Catch a Chinchilla? Verifying Rules on Large-Scale Neural Network Training via Compute Monitoring; Kulp et al. (2024), Hardware-Enabled Governance Mechanisms (RAND WR-A3056-1); AI Security Forum, Requests for Discussion; Proofworks, Living Verification Documents.

Sub-questions

IDSub-questionWhat the sources report
P055.1What cost and time does a well-equipped lab need to extract the device identity / attestation key from an H100/B200-class accelerator by physical attack (or defeat signed-firmware enforcement)?partly answered
P055.2How many traces / hours does the best side-channel (power/EM) attack need to extract the attestation key from an accelerator RoT or a HEM guarantee processor?implied by a source, not stated as open
P055.3Once an attack on a mechanism is known, what is its marginal per-chip cost, time and success rate — i.e. does it scale — and can moderate per-chip fault-injection detection suffice statistically?implied by a source, not stated as open
P055.4Has any current accelerator's key storage or security module undergone an external physical-attack evaluation at a high Common Criteria / FIPS 140-3 level, and is HSM/SEP evidence transferable to state attackers?implied by a source, not stated as open
P055.5Is there a device-key provisioning process witnessed by both parties such that neither can hold a copy of the key?open
P055.6Can firmware-signing authority on a current accelerator be transferred from the vendor to a Verifier by key revocation?partly answered
P055.7Does any leading AI accelerator include a dedicated hardware security module region?implied by a source, not stated as open
P055.8Does any shipping accelerator with significant data-centre share integrate an open-source, externally audited RoT (Caliptra/OpenTitan) whose silicon a third party checked against the design?partly answered
P055.9Has an open-source design providing secure boot + confidential computing + on-chip tamper response (or a guarantee-processor IP block) been taped out and passed external red-team / glitch / side-channel testing?open

Sub-questions not yet stated precisely enough to check

IDSub-question
P055.10Could one software/firmware vulnerability, or a covert compromise plus withheld signatures, give fast scalable compromise across a fleet?
P055.11Can security rest on something other than stored hardware keys (e.g. secret bits embedded in physical matter)?

Possibly relevant work found by automated search

Found by AI agents searching for this problem's sub-questions, mostly by keyword and citation in the OpenAlex scholarly database and on the web; a second AI pass reviewed each one, and we spot-checked some by hand. They seemed reasonably related, as far as one can tell from outside each paper's field. Some come from neighbouring fields, such as arms control and financial audit, and bear on the problem by analogy. Not reviewed against the status above; a paper listed here does not change that status. 928 of 1052 quotes checked word for word against the paper's text.

For P055.1: What cost and time does a well-equipped lab need to extract the device identity / attestation key from an H100/B200-class accelerator by physical attack (or defeat signed-firmware enforcement)?

For P055.2: How many traces / hours does the best side-channel (power/EM) attack need to extract the attestation key from an accelerator RoT or a HEM guarantee processor?

For P055.3: Once an attack on a mechanism is known, what is its marginal per-chip cost, time and success rate — i.e. does it scale — and can moderate per-chip fault-injection detection suffice statistically?

For P055.6: Can firmware-signing authority on a current accelerator be transferred from the vendor to a Verifier by key revocation?

For P055.8: Does any shipping accelerator with significant data-centre share integrate an open-source, externally audited RoT (Caliptra/OpenTitan) whose silicon a third party checked against the design?

Data