P065 Time to deploy on-chip governance mechanisms
How long would on-chip mechanisms take to design, test and reach the installed base?
How long on-chip mechanisms take to design, test externally and reach a stated share of the installed base.
Status
Analyzed A modelled estimate: 3.7-7.9 years for chips with built-in flexHEG hardware to displace older accelerators in frontier AI development, counted from when the manufacturer starts work. Other published estimates: 'at least a few years' (Harack et al. 2025); months for firmware-only mechanisms and 18 months to 4 years for silicon changes (Aarne, Fist & Withers 2024). No estimate has been checked against an actual deployment.
this estimate predicts 3.7 - 7.9 years for flexHEG with integrated hardware to displace non-flexHEG accelerators in frontier AI development
Raised in: Harack et al. (2025), Verification for International AI Governance (Oxford AIGI); Scher & Thiergart (2024), Mechanisms to Verify International Agreements About AI Development (MIRI); Petrie & Aarne (2025), Technical Options for Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees (flexHEG Part 2); Aarne & Petrie (2025), International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees (flexHEG Part 3); Aarne, Fist & Withers (2024), Secure, Governable Chips (CNAS); Cankaya (2026), Compute Verification FAQs; Ansari (2026), Hardware-Level Governance of AI Compute: A Feasibility Taxonomy for Regulatory Compliance and Treaty Verification; Kulp et al. (2024), Hardware-Enabled Governance Mechanisms (RAND WR-A3056-1); Wasil, Reed, Miller & Barnett (2024), Verification Methods for International AI Agreements; Peigné-Lefebvre, Nguyen & Wang (2026), Zero Knowledge Verification for Frontier AI Training Is Possible, arXiv 2606.05433.
Sub-questions
| ID | Sub-question | What the sources report |
|---|---|---|
| P065.1 | For a past security feature (e.g. H100 CC) or a new accelerator generation, how many months/years from announcement to a stated share of installed frontier compute? | a source suggests an answer (not checked) |
Sub-questions not yet stated precisely enough to check
| ID | Sub-question |
|---|---|
| P065.2 | When can robust tamper-proof packaging / high physical security for openly adversarial use exist (sources: 18 mo–8 yr), and is it the central obstacle? |
| P065.3 | How long do new secure chips / security modules take to design, test externally and reach market share (≥1 yr design + ≥1 yr testing; 6–10 yr RoT build cycle)? |
| P065.4 | Are new on-chip mechanisms technically viable, politically acceptable and deployable over a multi-year rollout? |
| P065.5 | What R&D is needed for cluster-use reporting, secure NVM logging and chip-based reporting (hardware, firmware, drivers)? |
Possibly relevant work found by automated search
Searched; nothing found for these sub-questions.
Data
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