P066 Guarantee processor and verification co-hardware

Can a guarantee processor (verification co-hardware) be interposed on accelerator I/O at acceptable overhead, with binding that detects its removal?

Guarantee processors and verification co-hardware: overhead, binding, feature set.

Terms: guarantee processor (verification co-hardware): a separate, trusted chip placed alongside an accelerator to watch its inputs and outputs and enforce or attest rules.

Status

Analyzed A design, not a build: the flexHEG Guarantee Processor plus Interlock sitting on the accelerator data path, with four candidate placements and a qualitative latency/throughput trade-off (requirements rise the closer the interlock is to the die). Overhead clause: not analysed anywhere; Ansari 2026 says the performance cost of mediating all chip I/O is 'not yet addressed in the published literature'. Binding clause: only qualitative statements (retrofitted hardware 'may be easier for an attacker to decouple'; flexHEG Part 3 poses how the 'brain' could be integrated so it cannot be easily swapped out as an open question); no pairing scheme, no detection rate. The flexHEG team's power-measurement prototype is a retrofit guarantee processor that makes external measurements and does not sit on the I/O path, so it is a cross-reference, not evidence for this headline.

The Interlock could be implemented in several ways, including 1) as an IP block within the accelerator die, 2) as a chiplet sitting near the accelerator die, 3) as a part of high bandwidth memory (HBM), or 4) as a separate component that operates as a network relay or switch.
Petrie & Aarne (2025), Technical Options for Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees (flexHEG Part 2) (2025-04 (April 2025 report; arXiv v1 2025-06-03)), L1054–1056

Posed by

Also raised in: Harack et al. (2025), Verification for International AI Governance (Oxford AIGI); Petrie, Aarne, Ammann & Dalrymple (2025), Overview of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees (flexHEG Part 1); Petrie & Aarne (2025), Technical Options for Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees (flexHEG Part 2); Aarne & Petrie (2025), International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees (flexHEG Part 3); Shavit (2023), What Does It Take to Catch a Chinchilla? Verifying Rules on Large-Scale Neural Network Training via Compute Monitoring; AI Security Forum, Requests for Discussion; Amodo (2026), AI 2040 Plan A — How You Can Help; Proofworks, Living Verification Documents.

Sub-questions

IDSub-questionWhat the sources report
P066.1What throughput/latency overhead does a guarantee processor interposed on all chip I/O (NVLink-class) add, i.e. can the accelerator sit outside the trusted computing base at acceptable cost?partly answered
P066.2Can a candidate guarantee processor recompute one SM's output stream in real time (throughput ≈1/192 of a Blackwell)?open
P066.3Can existing on-accelerator processors (GSP, NIC, BMC, GPU RISC-V cores) serve as guarantee processors via firmware alone, per a published security analysis?open
P066.4Has one guarantee-processor design been integrated on accelerators from multiple vendors on short notice?open
P066.5Is there a binding method (pairing + tamper evidence) under which swapping or detaching a guarantee chip / mated host CPU is detected, with measured detection rate and time-to-detach in red-team tests?open
P066.6Does a guarantee-processor candidate pass a published glitch-injection test suite / FIPS-like certification?open
P066.7Can verification logic sit on or near HBM (programmable logic in the HBM stack, HBM guarantee chiplet) at the needed latency/throughput, and where should it sit (HBM, die, NIC)?implied by a source, not stated as open
P066.8Has a dual-processor (one per bloc) output-matching design been built and tested to lock down on mismatch, given cross-bloc co-design is judged infeasible?a source suggests an answer (not checked)
P066.9Do typical GPU servers have a free PCIe slot or port to attach a >=5 KB/s on-node witness non-invasively?open
P066.10Can an SM be audited to interpret kernel code, and what area/power overhead does a per-SM kernel-logging block add?open

Sub-questions not yet stated precisely enough to check

IDSub-question
P066.11Can guarantee-processor cryptography be side-channel-free and quantum-secure?
P066.12Are DC-SCM-based readings off the main data path spoofable?
P066.13What is the minimum viable guarantee processor / secure co-processor / verification ASIC feature set (secure boot, lockstep, months of logs, secure NVM)?
P066.14How can keys for kernel-level encryption be transported safely?
P066.15Can prover-made and verifier-made hardware be mixed in one node safely?

Possibly relevant work found by automated search

Found by AI agents searching for this problem's sub-questions, mostly by keyword and citation in the OpenAlex scholarly database and on the web; a second AI pass reviewed each one, and we spot-checked some by hand. They seemed reasonably related, as far as one can tell from outside each paper's field. Some come from neighbouring fields, such as arms control and financial audit, and bear on the problem by analogy. Not reviewed against the status above; a paper listed here does not change that status. 928 of 1052 quotes checked word for word against the paper's text.

For P066.1: What throughput/latency overhead does a guarantee processor interposed on all chip I/O (NVLink-class) add, i.e. can the accelerator sit outside the trusted computing base at acceptable cost?

For P066.3: Can existing on-accelerator processors (GSP, NIC, BMC, GPU RISC-V cores) serve as guarantee processors via firmware alone, per a published security analysis?

For P066.5: Is there a binding method (pairing + tamper evidence) under which swapping or detaching a guarantee chip / mated host CPU is detected, with measured detection rate and time-to-detach in red-team tests?

For P066.7: Can verification logic sit on or near HBM (programmable logic in the HBM stack, HBM guarantee chiplet) at the needed latency/throughput, and where should it sit (HBM, die, NIC)?

For P066.10: Can an SM be audited to interpret kernel code, and what area/power overhead does a per-SM kernel-logging block add?

For P066.11: Can guarantee-processor cryptography be side-channel-free and quantum-secure?

For P066.13: What is the minimum viable guarantee processor / secure co-processor / verification ASIC feature set (secure boot, lockstep, months of logs, secure NVM)?

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