P068 Licence issuance and key governance
Who should issue operating licences and hold the signing keys, and how can issuance and emergency-disable powers be made abuse-resistant?
Who issues operating licences and holds the signing keys (criteria, k-of-n signer sets across jurisdictions, bootstrapping, liveness), and how issuance and emergency-disable powers are kept abuse-resistant.
Terms: k of n (k-of-n): a threshold scheme in which an action needs the approval of any k of the n parties, so it keeps working after up to n−k keys are lost.
Status
Analyzed A protocol sketch with pseudocode: k-of-n multilateral signing of licence and guarantee updates, graded quorums by update type, and signer-set changes by update. No prototype (Ansari 2026: 'No prototype exists'), and the open parts are stated by the proposers themselves: who the licence authority is, how the signer set is bootstrapped, what k and n should be, timeout handling for unresponsive signatories, proofs of non-issuance ('would probably require hardware-backed evidence from all devices that contain the private key'), and the blast radius of a stolen signing key. Abuse resistance of emergency disable: Baker et al. 2025 judge it not to need significant R&D because proposals exist; that is a readiness opinion, not evidence.
The update process could require that the update (or lack of update) be multilaterally approved by k of n parties, so that no single actor could unilaterally impose excessive restrictions (as discussed for an international context in Part III). The pseudocode in algorithm 1 shows how multi-party update approval could be implemented.
Posed by
- Ansari (2026), Hardware-Level Governance of AI Compute: A Feasibility Taxonomy for Regulatory Compliance and Treaty Verification:
No prototype exists; major open questions include key management architecture, timeout handling when a signatory is unresponsive
(§3.2 V5, p.8; L440–441)
Also raised in: Harack et al. (2025), Verification for International AI Governance (Oxford AIGI); Baker, Kulp, Marks, Brundage & Heim (2025), Verifying International Agreements on AI: Six Layers of Verification for Rules on Large-Scale AI Development and Deployment (RAND WR-A4077-1); Petrie, Aarne, Ammann & Dalrymple (2025), Overview of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees (flexHEG Part 1); Petrie & Aarne (2025), Technical Options for Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees (flexHEG Part 2); Aarne, Fist & Withers (2024), Secure, Governable Chips (CNAS); Kulp et al. (2024), Hardware-Enabled Governance Mechanisms (RAND WR-A3056-1); AI Security Forum, Requests for Discussion.
Sub-questions
| ID | Sub-question | What the sources report |
|---|---|---|
| P068.1 | Has a threshold (k-of-n) licensing / remote-disable scheme distributed across jurisdictions been specified and implemented, with liveness under loss of n−k keys shown? | open |
| P068.2 | What latency (s) does m-of-n threshold-signature approval add to training-job launch, and how are unresponsive signatories handled? | open |
| P068.3 | Is there a protocol by which an authority proves a given licence or firmware update was not signed/issued, with stated assumptions? | open |
| P068.4 | How are licensor/authorization keys protected against theft, and what is the blast radius of compromising a licensor or other third party (CA, oversight body)? | partly answered |
| P068.5 | Can emergency pause/disable and compliance-locking mechanisms be made abuse-resistant? | open |
Sub-questions not yet stated precisely enough to check
| ID | Sub-question |
|---|---|
| P068.6 | How should undelivered licences and sequence gaps be handled? |
| P068.7 | Who creates and signs chip licences (vendor, government, international body), on what criteria? |
| P068.8 | Who may sign 'irrevocably allowed' workloads, and under what conditions? |
| P068.9 | Who may issue administrative requests to devices, what instructions are permitted, and how is abuse prevented? |
| P068.10 | What k/n is right for different international configurations? |
| P068.11 | How is the initial signer set bootstrapped? |
| P068.12 | How are market incentives to issue licences balanced against incentives to enforce compliance? |
Possibly relevant work found by automated search
Found by AI agents searching for this problem's sub-questions, mostly by keyword and citation in the OpenAlex scholarly database and on the web; a second AI pass reviewed each one, and we spot-checked some by hand. They seemed reasonably related, as far as one can tell from outside each paper's field. Some come from neighbouring fields, such as arms control and financial audit, and bear on the problem by analogy. Not reviewed against the status above; a paper listed here does not change that status. 928 of 1052 quotes checked word for word against the paper's text.
For P068.1: Has a threshold (k-of-n) licensing / remote-disable scheme distributed across jurisdictions been specified and implemented, with liveness under loss of n−k keys shown?
For P068.3: Is there a protocol by which an authority proves a given licence or firmware update was not signed/issued, with stated assumptions?
Data
- problems.csv — one row per problem
- problem_status.csv — status, scope and evidence per problem
- problem_sources.csv — the posed-by quote and other documents per problem
- leaves.csv — all sub-questions, including those without a checkable form
- leaf_sources.csv — every source row behind each sub-question