P096 Inference deployment monitoring
Can an operator prove all inference passed through a given monitor, and how well can misuse or diversion be caught among approved traffic?
Monitoring inference deployments for coverage, misuse and diversion.
Status
Analyzed A design: a verifier-developed classifier that the deployer must run on all inputs and outputs, with coverage ensured by weight containment plus cluster-level batch authorization; the authors rate feasibility 'Medium; 1-2 years'; nothing built or measured for either clause. Proving coverage to an outside inspector: paper only (also flexHEG Part 1's inference receipts). Catching misuse among approved traffic at a stated false-positive rate: paper only; the authors argue low sensitivity may be tolerable. Compute diverted before telemetry flags it: Hausenloy & Li's second-hand claim is not evidence.
One major hurdle is ensuring that all relevant inputs and outputs are passed through the classifier. One way to achieve this is to both: prevent weights from leaving the data center, and have close monitoring of all chips in the data center.
Posed by
- Scher (2026), Verifying Restrictions on Frontier AI Research (MIRI):
there would be a small difficulty in adding AI R&D to the set of prohibited uses and a large difficulty in proving comprehensive monitoring to external inspectors.
(§3.3, p.7, L590–593)
Also raised in: Harack et al. (2025), Verification for International AI Governance (Oxford AIGI); Scher & Thiergart (2024), Mechanisms to Verify International Agreements About AI Development (MIRI); Petrie, Aarne, Ammann & Dalrymple (2025), Overview of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees (flexHEG Part 1); Aarne & Petrie (2025), International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees (flexHEG Part 3); Cankaya (2026), A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification (v0.2); Cankaya (2026), Compute Verification FAQs; Ansari (2026), Hardware-Level Governance of AI Compute: A Feasibility Taxonomy for Regulatory Compliance and Treaty Verification; Daley (2026), Proving the Negative: Three Warnings from Arms Control for the Age of AI (War on the Rocks); Hausenloy & Li (2026), The Compute Verification Post; Proofworks, Living Verification Documents.
Sub-questions
| ID | Sub-question | What the sources report |
|---|---|---|
| P096.1 | Can an operator prove to an outside inspector that all inference requests on a cluster passed through a given classifier/monitor, with a measured coverage gap? | open |
| P096.2 | Can attested inference receipts show compute spent on monitors/safeguards vs the policy model to a stated precision? | open |
| P096.3 | At a stated false-positive rate, what recall does a compliance classifier achieve on blacklisted-use tasks hidden among whitelisted-model traffic? | open |
| P096.4 | What compute overhead and latency do separate verification infrastructures and compliance test suites add to serving? | open |
| P096.5 | Can inference weight containment (all instances known) be made internationally verifiable and insider-resistant, e.g. via bottlenecked distributed inference? | open |
| P096.6 | What is the attack success rate of prompt injection against LLM inspector agents, and does classifier robustness keep pace with AI progress? | open |
| P096.7 | Can agent computations using external tools (web) be logged and replayed for verification? | open |
| P096.8 | What is the latency from the start of an above-threshold run to an alarm, for a given mechanism? | open |
| P096.9 | What fraction of a cluster's GPU-hours can be diverted before scheduler/DCGM telemetry flags it? | implied by a source, not stated as open |
Sub-questions not yet stated precisely enough to check
| ID | Sub-question |
|---|---|
| P096.10 | What share of deployment usage must be examined to catch small, causally unrelated defections, and how can the examined space be limited? |
| P096.11 | Does deployment governance require more sensitive information than development governance? |
| P096.12 | Is detailed verification for computational emergencies workable? |
Possibly relevant work found by automated search
Found by AI agents searching for this problem's sub-questions, mostly by keyword and citation in the OpenAlex scholarly database and on the web; a second AI pass reviewed each one, and we spot-checked some by hand. They seemed reasonably related, as far as one can tell from outside each paper's field. Some come from neighbouring fields, such as arms control and financial audit, and bear on the problem by analogy. Not reviewed against the status above; a paper listed here does not change that status. 928 of 1052 quotes checked word for word against the paper's text.
For P096.6: What is the attack success rate of prompt injection against LLM inspector agents, and does classifier robustness keep pace with AI progress?
Data
- problems.csv — one row per problem
- problem_status.csv — status, scope and evidence per problem
- problem_sources.csv — the posed-by quote and other documents per problem
- leaves.csv — all sub-questions, including those without a checkable form
- leaf_sources.csv — every source row behind each sub-question