P115 Enforcement and response

What response follows detection, how is it made proportionate and deterrent, and how is enforcement separated from verification?

Response and enforcement after detection.

Status

Analyzed A draft treaty's proposed response ladder (diplomacy, sanctions, escalation to disruption), with the same text separating detection of covert violations from nonproliferation and enforcement; proportionality is specified only for domestic penalties on restricted research (Article IX: 'proportionate to the severity of the violation and ... designed to act as a sufficient deterrent'). Nothing modelled, tested or exercised; no attribution procedure. Baker et al. (RAND 2025, Table 4) list the same options (reciprocation, sanctions, export controls, withdrawal of guarantees, cyber or kinetic attacks, technical mechanisms) and note they 'would ideally be effective deterrents and thus never carried out'; Harack et al. put most enforcement outside their scope.

"Should nonproliferation fail, or if a rogue actor is found to be working towards ASI, coalition members can employ their agreed-upon enforcement mechanisms. These start with standard tools of international pressure such as diplomacy and economic sanctions. Depending on the nature of the developments, countries could escalate to other means at their disposal to disrupt, slow, or impede ASI development."
Scher, Abecassis, Barnett & Abeyta (2025), An International Agreement to Prevent the Premature Creation of Artificial Superintelligence (MIRI; arXiv 2511.10783), overview of the agreement (2025 (arXiv v1 2025-11-13; saved text is v3, 2026-05-08)), L307–311

Posed by

Also raised in: Aarne & Petrie (2025), International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees (flexHEG Part 3); Cankaya (2026), Compute Verification FAQs; Daley (2026), Proving the Negative: Three Warnings from Arms Control for the Age of AI (War on the Rocks); Kulp et al. (2024), Hardware-Enabled Governance Mechanisms (RAND WR-A3056-1); Wasil, Reed, Miller & Barnett (2024), Verification Methods for International AI Agreements; AI Security Forum, Requests for Discussion.

Sub-questions

None with a checkable form.

Sub-questions not yet stated precisely enough to check

IDSub-question
P115.1What response follows detection, how is it proportionate to severity, and what makes it deterrent?
P115.2What policy (especially diplomatic) responses exist when mechanism compromise is attempted?
P115.3Given verification cannot compel compliance or verification itself, how is enforcement separated from verification?
P115.4Is a prevent-escape regime (inspectors, cameras, monitoring, reruns, power-off) sufficient?
P115.5What interim measures (interconnect removal, human intelligence) deter before verification devices exist?
P115.6What can cooperative safeguards not do (e.g. bind inferences from other intelligence)?

Possibly relevant work found by automated search

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