P115 Enforcement and response
What response follows detection, how is it made proportionate and deterrent, and how is enforcement separated from verification?
Response and enforcement after detection.
Status
Analyzed A draft treaty's proposed response ladder (diplomacy, sanctions, escalation to disruption), with the same text separating detection of covert violations from nonproliferation and enforcement; proportionality is specified only for domestic penalties on restricted research (Article IX: 'proportionate to the severity of the violation and ... designed to act as a sufficient deterrent'). Nothing modelled, tested or exercised; no attribution procedure. Baker et al. (RAND 2025, Table 4) list the same options (reciprocation, sanctions, export controls, withdrawal of guarantees, cyber or kinetic attacks, technical mechanisms) and note they 'would ideally be effective deterrents and thus never carried out'; Harack et al. put most enforcement outside their scope.
"Should nonproliferation fail, or if a rogue actor is found to be working towards ASI, coalition members can employ their agreed-upon enforcement mechanisms. These start with standard tools of international pressure such as diplomacy and economic sanctions. Depending on the nature of the developments, countries could escalate to other means at their disposal to disrupt, slow, or impede ASI development."
Posed by
- Koopmanschap & Barten (2026), How to Catch a GPU: A Taxonomy of Verification and Enforcement Mechanisms for International AI Agreements:
What response follows detection, and what is required for that response to deter violations, is not specified.
(§7 Limitations, p.13; L587–588)
Also raised in: Aarne & Petrie (2025), International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees (flexHEG Part 3); Cankaya (2026), Compute Verification FAQs; Daley (2026), Proving the Negative: Three Warnings from Arms Control for the Age of AI (War on the Rocks); Kulp et al. (2024), Hardware-Enabled Governance Mechanisms (RAND WR-A3056-1); Wasil, Reed, Miller & Barnett (2024), Verification Methods for International AI Agreements; AI Security Forum, Requests for Discussion.
Sub-questions
None with a checkable form.
Sub-questions not yet stated precisely enough to check
| ID | Sub-question |
|---|---|
| P115.1 | What response follows detection, how is it proportionate to severity, and what makes it deterrent? |
| P115.2 | What policy (especially diplomatic) responses exist when mechanism compromise is attempted? |
| P115.3 | Given verification cannot compel compliance or verification itself, how is enforcement separated from verification? |
| P115.4 | Is a prevent-escape regime (inspectors, cameras, monitoring, reruns, power-off) sufficient? |
| P115.5 | What interim measures (interconnect removal, human intelligence) deter before verification devices exist? |
| P115.6 | What can cooperative safeguards not do (e.g. bind inferences from other intelligence)? |
Possibly relevant work found by automated search
Not searched: no technical result was expected for this problem.
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