P116 International verification body: powers and governance

What powers, governance, staffing and access should an international AI verification body have?

The powers, governance, staffing, inspector model, access and registry governance of an international AI verification body.

Status

Started An empirical result from the Alva Myrdal Centre Arms Control Agreement Database (99 compliance mechanisms, 33 treaties, 1959 to 2015) on one leg only, the inspector model. Powers, decision-making, staffing, trigger calibration, access provisions and registry governance have paper proposals at most (the authors' three-layer inspectorate; Harack et al. and Scher treat body design as political and out of scope), and the authors call them 'the substantive work ahead'.

The scope of the agreement is strongly associated with the inspector model. Bilateral treaties use party-on-party inspectors 95% of the time; multilateral treaties use institutional inspectors 47.4% of the time, roughly 10× the bilateral rate of 4.9%.
Leklem & Maheshwari (2026), How Should We 'Inspect' Artificial Intelligence? (Alva Myrdal Centre insights) (2026-06-16), L80–83

Raised in: Harack et al. (2025), Verification for International AI Governance (Oxford AIGI); Baker, Kulp, Marks, Brundage & Heim (2025), Verifying International Agreements on AI: Six Layers of Verification for Rules on Large-Scale AI Development and Deployment (RAND WR-A4077-1); Shavit (2023), What Does It Take to Catch a Chinchilla? Verifying Rules on Large-Scale Neural Network Training via Compute Monitoring; Scher (2026), Verifying Restrictions on Frontier AI Research (MIRI); Ilhan, Withers, Gietz & Harack (2026), Verifiable Semiconductor Manufacturing (Oxford AIGI); Hausenloy & Li (2026), The Compute Verification Post; Koopmanschap & Barten (2026), How to Catch a GPU: A Taxonomy of Verification and Enforcement Mechanisms for International AI Agreements; Leklem & Maheshwari (2026), How Should We 'Inspect' Artificial Intelligence? (AMC Insights); Wasil, Reed, Miller & Barnett (2024), Verification Methods for International AI Agreements; AI Security Forum, Requests for Discussion.

Sub-questions

IDSub-questionWhat the sources report
P116.1Should a treaty use bilateral, third-party or institutional (international) inspectors?a source suggests an answer (not checked)
P116.2What salary multiple over IAEA scale fills ML-inspector posts at the OPCW vacancy rate?open

Sub-questions not yet stated precisely enough to check

IDSub-question
P116.3What should the international verification body's powers, decision-making, staffing, trigger calibration, access provisions and dispute resolution be?
P116.4How do parties verify that each other's domestic enforcement is executed correctly?
P116.5Can an inspectorate without national intelligence find dark compute via NGO capacity?
P116.6Can direct verification be substituted by indirect verification, and at what reliability loss?
P116.7Does an international consortium of governments need to monitor the chip supply chain on behalf of verifiers, and how?
P116.8What governance frameworks incentivize adoption of credible verification practices?
P116.9Who should govern the chip registry (international body, consortium, distributed)?
P116.10What is the technical composition and location of a model registry?

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