P117 Security and legibility of the verification body
Can a verification body run its own operations securely against infiltration, and be transparent enough to be trusted without leaking what it holds?
Whether a verification body can run its own operations securely against infiltration and be transparent enough to be trusted without leaking what it holds.
Status
Posed
Raised in: Harack et al. (2025), Verification for International AI Governance (Oxford AIGI); Baker, Kulp, Marks, Brundage & Heim (2025), Verifying International Agreements on AI: Six Layers of Verification for Rules on Large-Scale AI Development and Deployment (RAND WR-A4077-1); Ilhan, Withers, Gietz & Harack (2026), Verifiable Semiconductor Manufacturing (Oxford AIGI); Rahman & Tajdari (2026), Detecting Hidden ML Training With Zero-Overhead Telemetry (MIRI).
Sub-questions
| ID | Sub-question | What the sources report |
|---|---|---|
| P117.1 | Can neutral third parties receive fab process or design data for integrity verification under privacy-preserving arrangements? | implied by a source, not stated as open |
Sub-questions not yet stated precisely enough to check
| ID | Sub-question |
|---|---|
| P117.2 | Can international institutions be legible enough to be trusted by member states but not leaky? |
| P117.3 | Can the verifier run its own protocols securely (personnel, physical, IT) against infiltration, e.g. a developer backdooring the regulator's classifier? |
Possibly relevant work found by automated search
Not searched: no technical result was expected for this problem.
Data
- problems.csv — one row per problem
- problem_status.csv — status, scope and evidence per problem
- problem_sources.csv — the posed-by quote and other documents per problem
- leaves.csv — all sub-questions, including those without a checkable form
- leaf_sources.csv — every source row behind each sub-question