P118 Translating treaty commitments into checkable rules

Which arms-control commitments can be translated into technically checkable rules, and how?

Which arms-control commitments can be turned into technically checkable rules, and how machine-checkable artifacts map to treaty commitments.

Status

Analyzed A paper mapping of candidate agreement types (compute caps, mandated evaluations, public reporting, non-proliferation, ruleset-based agreements) onto claims a flexHEG device could check; the same report poses the translation question as open for military cyber-physical systems. Harack et al. (2025) analyse verification requirements by agreement type in their section on agreements. The mapping from machine-checkable artifacts (receipts, audit trails) to legal instruments raised by AI 2040 has no worked example; nothing implemented.

Verification of such claims could be used to verify compliance with formal agreements regarding any of the above, such as agreements not to train models above a given size or capability level, agreements to ensure that models always need to attain sufficient scores on particular safety evaluations, or agreements to simply publicly report the results of verifiable evaluations.
Aarne & Petrie (2025), International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees (flexHEG Part 3) (2025-06-18), L1116–1120

Posed by

Also raised in: AI 2040 (2026), Get Involved in Verification.

Sub-questions

None with a checkable form.

Sub-questions not yet stated precisely enough to check

IDSub-question
P118.1How can machine-checkable artifacts (receipts, audit trails) be mapped to legal/treaty commitments, and which arms-control commitments translate into technically checkable rules?

Possibly relevant work found by automated search

Not searched: no technical result was expected for this problem.

Data