P119 Legal limits on verification operations

What legal limits apply to verification operations: retaining captured data across borders, defensive jamming, and non-interference with national technical means?

The legal limits on verification operations: retaining captured data across borders, defensive jamming, sensors in territorial waters, and non-interference with national technical means.

Status

Started One leg only, non-interference with national technical means: a count from the Alva Myrdal Centre treaty database (99 mechanisms, 33 treaties, 1959 to 2015) showing such clauses exist only in bilateral treaties, so a multilateral AI treaty's clause would be novel; Scher (2026) notes SALT I to New START authorise NTM and prohibit interference (precedent). Cross-border retention of captured data (Cankaya: 'will vary on a case-by-case basis') and defensive jamming (Cankaya: 'out-of-scope') have no work. Teague et al.'s estimate that passive acoustic sensors would need to sit inside the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea is for the statement's territorial-waters clause, not the headline (related).

All 10 NTM non-interference clauses and all 7 concealment prohibitions in the dataset are bilateral.
Leklem & Maheshwari (2026), How Should We 'Inspect' Artificial Intelligence? (Alva Myrdal Centre insights) (2026-06-16), L89–90

Raised in: Scher (2026), Verifying Restrictions on Frontier AI Research (MIRI); Cankaya (2026), Research Note: The Fundamentals and Feasibility of Secure Network Taps for Verifying AI Datacenter Use; Cankaya (2026), Suppressing Side Channels in an Untrusted Data Center via Retrofitted Defenses (MIRI); Koopmanschap & Barten (2026), How to Catch a GPU: A Taxonomy of Verification and Enforcement Mechanisms for International AI Agreements; Leklem & Maheshwari (2026), How Should We 'Inspect' Artificial Intelligence? (AMC Insights); Teague, Rajmohan & Muehlhaeuser (2026), Could Underwater Data Centers Pose a Risk to AI Treaty Verification?, arXiv 2609.18824.

Sub-questions

IDSub-questionWhat the sources report
P119.1Which remote-sensing methods (passive acoustics, active sonar, AUV survey) require sensors in the target's territorial sea or express treaty provision, and at what detection range?a source suggests an answer (not checked)
P119.2Can a multilateral AI treaty include and sustain a national-technical-means non-interference clause, given that bilateral arms-control treaties do and no multilateral one has?open

Sub-questions not yet stated precisely enough to check

IDSub-question
P119.3What is the legal status of retaining captured verification data across jurisdictions?
P119.4Is radio jamming as a verification defence legal?
P119.5Do legal, commercial and sovereignty frictions bind earlier than technical limits?

Possibly relevant work found by automated search

Found by AI agents searching for this problem's sub-questions, mostly by keyword and citation in the OpenAlex scholarly database and on the web; a second AI pass reviewed each one, and we spot-checked some by hand. They seemed reasonably related, as far as one can tell from outside each paper's field. Some come from neighbouring fields, such as arms control and financial audit, and bear on the problem by analogy. Not reviewed against the status above; a paper listed here does not change that status. 928 of 1052 quotes checked word for word against the paper's text.

For P119.2: Can a multilateral AI treaty include and sustain a national-technical-means non-interference clause, given that bilateral arms-control treaties do and no multilateral one has?

* Full text not reviewed; more likely to contain errors.

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