P120 Participation and coverage across states
How can declarations and coverage be extended across the compute-hosting states, and how do non-participants' capabilities affect a partial agreement?
Participation and coverage across states.
Status
Analyzed A plan-level proposal: US–China mutual declaration first (about 85% of global compute), then extension to the 5–10 other compute-hosting nations to reach 99%, with urgency tied to intelligence uncertainty about those nations' compute; no mechanism for securing participation and no modelling of a partial agreement. Baker et al. (RAND 2025, Table 4) list options for attaining participation (export controls and energy policy to keep hardware in cooperative states, dialogues, leverage). Non-participants clause: Harack et al. (2025) note only that protocols for non-global agreements 'may have to take into account the existence of non-participating states'; Daley poses the dependence on other states; host-state seizure (Harack et al.) is a stated risk.
"Extend this declaration to other countries with significant compute ownership or production capacity. Do so urgently unless there is confident intelligence in place that would detect this compute being moved."
Posed by
- Daley (2026), Proving the Negative: Three Warnings from Arms Control for the Age of AI (War on the Rocks):
A real regime would depend on cooperation from other states that host relevant chips, cloud services, and distributed training capacity.
(Intro, L69–70)
Also raised in: Harack et al. (2025), Verification for International AI Governance (Oxford AIGI); Dean, Verification Plan (AI 2040).
Sub-questions
None with a checkable form.
Sub-questions not yet stated precisely enough to check
| ID | Sub-question |
|---|---|
| P120.1 | How should protocols account for non-participating states' capabilities in non-global agreements? |
| P120.2 | How can declarations be extended to the 5–10 other compute-hosting nations and third states hosting chips, cloud and distributed capacity? |
| P120.3 | What implementation phases are granular and reassuring enough to all sides? |
| P120.4 | Can a host state seize verification facilities on its territory, and what follows? |
Possibly relevant work found by automated search
Not searched: no technical result was expected for this problem.
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