P121 Building trust in shared mechanism designs

Does shared design documentation plus adversarial review build enough international trust in shared mechanisms, or will states insist on de novo designs?

Building international trust in shared mechanism designs and standards.

Status

Analyzed A qualitative desk comparison of three routes to a trusted standard (adapting existing commercial designs, open-source projects such as OpenTitan, seL4 and Caliptra, and a de novo international collaboration), weighing the security limits of commercial designs and the precedent of weakened encryption standards; no review conducted, no standard written, no state's position recorded. Standards for assessing other parties' solutions, trust in lab findings and an appliance standard: calls for work only.

"Concerns about subtle vulnerabilities could likely be addressed through a detailed international review of the design, where each design choice is carefully justified to ensure that it was not animated by any ulterior motive. However, sufficiently suspicious states may still insist that the only acceptable long-term solution is a de novo design."
Aarne & Petrie (2025), International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees (flexHEG Part 3), Establishing Trust in Existing Designs (2025-06 (arXiv 2506.15100)), L245–248

Posed by

Also raised in: Petrie & Aarne (2025), Technical Options for Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees (flexHEG Part 2); Aarne & Petrie (2025), International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees (flexHEG Part 3); Cankaya (2026), Bit-Exact AI Inference Verification Without Performance Tradeoffs, arXiv 2606.00279v2; Abdelghafar & Kulp (2026), Privacy-Preserving AI Verification via Minimal Information Disclosure; Karvonen et al. (2025), DiFR: Inference Verification Despite Nondeterminism; AI Security Forum, Requests for Discussion; Dean, Verification Plan (AI 2040); Proofworks, Living Verification Documents.

Sub-questions

IDSub-questionWhat the sources report
P121.1Can a Groth16 circuit-specific trusted setup and verifiable sampling for randomized releases be run acceptably between parties?partly answered
P121.2Should providers be required to expose per-request seeds with a documented sampler, and how many of the top inference APIs do?open
P121.3What throughput cost does a mandated batch-size-sensitive (non-invariant) kernel set impose vs best invariant kernels?open

Sub-questions not yet stated precisely enough to check

IDSub-question
P121.4Does shared design documentation plus adversarial review build sufficient international trust, or will suspicious states insist on a de novo design?
P121.5What standards can credibly assess the trustworthiness of verification solutions supplied by other parties?
P121.6How can international trust in hardware-lab findings be established?
P121.7Is there a standard defining what an AI appliance is?
P121.8Who must share networking/compute paradigms so compatible taps and recomputation servers can be built?
P121.9Who declares the authorised target, protected properties and utility threshold before mechanism selection?

Possibly relevant work found by automated search

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Data