P125 What claims verification should target
Which verification claims are both useful and feasible — e.g. "civilian not military", "not building prohibited AI", a speed limit — and at what evidence granularity?
Which claims verification should target.
Status
Analyzed A desk mapping of agreement families (transfer knowledge, transfer resources, pool resources, prepare for emergencies, regulate development and deployment) to verification requirements and to mechanisms judged effective, mature and politically viable, including the conclusion that 'a true ban is likely impossible via blunt mechanisms, but is potentially workable via fine-grained controls'. The 'civilian not military' and 'not building prohibited AI' claims are posed by Harack (2026) without a feasibility result; a speed limit or pause: no work. Evidence-granularity clause: Cankaya asserts collision-resistant per-workload capture as a requirement and asks whether token-level capture is reasonable (self-deprecated v0.2); no work beyond that. Nothing piloted or negotiated.
"This section provides an overview of possible international agreements relating to AI and their verification requirements." … "These were chosen because they appear to be a compelling combination of a) effective, b) technologically mature, and c) politically viable."
Posed by
- Proofworks, Living Verification Documents:
Which claims are useful and feasible to verify?
(Verification claims; p.40, line 325)
Also raised in: Harack et al. (2025), Verification for International AI Governance (Oxford AIGI); Cankaya (2026), A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification (v0.2); Harack (2026), AI Verification: Infrastructure for Prosperity, Governance, and Peace (Lawfare).
Sub-questions
None with a checkable form.
Sub-questions not yet stated precisely enough to check
| ID | Sub-question |
|---|---|
| P125.1 | Which claims are both useful and feasible to verify? |
| P125.2 | Can a state credibly demonstrate that its civilian compute is used for civilian, not military, purposes? |
| P125.3 | Can a state credibly demonstrate it is not building a prohibited category of AI? |
| P125.4 | How would a 'speed limit' or pause be operationalised and verified? |
| P125.5 | What evidence granularity is needed: are aggregate checks (total FLOP, ratios) insufficient, and is collision-resistant per-workload or token-level evidence capture a reasonable goal? |
| P125.6 | Does a ban on large models require fine-grained controls rather than blunt mechanisms? |
Possibly relevant work found by automated search
Not searched: no technical result was expected for this problem.
Data
- problems.csv — one row per problem
- problem_status.csv — status, scope and evidence per problem
- problem_sources.csv — the posed-by quote and other documents per problem
- leaves.csv — all sub-questions, including those without a checkable form
- leaf_sources.csv — every source row behind each sub-question