P126 Independent readiness review
Have the mechanisms that verification proposals depend on had an independent technology-readiness review, and do independent ratings match the proponents' own?
Whether the mechanisms verification proposals depend on have had an independent technology-readiness review, whether independent ratings match the proponents' own, and the deployment timelines the sources give per mechanism family.
Status
Analyzed A literature-based feasibility taxonomy of about twenty hardware-governance mechanisms by an author outside the proponent groups; by its own limitations section the ratings come from the author's reading 'rather than from formal expert elicitation or independent technology readiness review'; no comparison of independent ratings against proponents' own. The per-family timelines in the sources (Cankaya: off-chip mechanisms in testing and de-risking as of July 2026; Harack et al.: a one-year crash program; Aarne et al.: about four years for on-chip uptake) are proponents' estimates and belong to those families' problems.
Our analysis reveals a structural mismatch: the mechanisms most needed for treaty verification … are also the least mature.
Raised in: Harack et al. (2025), Verification for International AI Governance (Oxford AIGI); Petrie, Aarne, Ammann & Dalrymple (2025), Overview of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees (flexHEG Part 1); Petrie & Aarne (2025), Technical Options for Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees (flexHEG Part 2); Aarne, Fist & Withers (2024), Secure, Governable Chips (CNAS); Scher (2026), Verifying Restrictions on Frontier AI Research (MIRI); Cankaya (2026), All Hands on Deck to Build the Datacenter Lie Detector; Cankaya (2026), Compute Verification FAQs; Canary Institute research; Ansari (2026), Hardware-Level Governance of AI Compute: A Feasibility Taxonomy for Regulatory Compliance and Treaty Verification; Harack (2026), AI Verification: Infrastructure for Prosperity, Governance, and Peace (Lawfare); Koopmanschap & Barten (2026), How to Catch a GPU: A Taxonomy of Verification and Enforcement Mechanisms for International AI Agreements; AI 2040 (2026), Get Involved in Verification; Dean, Verification Plan (AI 2040); Proofworks, Living Verification Documents.
Sub-questions
| ID | Sub-question | What the sources report |
|---|---|---|
| P126.1 | How long will retrofittable off-chip mechanisms take to deploy at scale, given they are (as of July 2026) still in testing and de-risking? | open |
| P126.2 | Has an end-to-end network-tap + recomputation inference-only retrofit been demonstrated on a production-scale rack? | open |
| P126.3 | If a deal were signed now, could it be enforced trustlessly at low cost, and if not, what fraction of frontier AI services would need to stay offline and for how long? | open |
| P126.4 | When will on-chip / flexHEG mechanisms with high physical security be deployed widely enough to be effective (source targets: at scale by 2027; ~4 years uptake after hardening)? | open |
| P126.5 | How long would a crash program take to make a few key data centres verifiable (~1 year per source) and a broader ecosystem (a few years per source)? | a source suggests an answer (not checked) |
| P126.6 | Do the mechanisms treaty proposals depend on (on-chip metering / chip-use verification, proof of training, hardware enforcement, privacy-preserving verification) all remain below governance grade (low on the paper's four-point feasibility scale)? | open |
| P126.7 | Do an independent expert panel's TRL ratings for the 20 mechanisms match the paper's own four-tier feasibility ratings? | open |
Sub-questions not yet stated precisely enough to check
| ID | Sub-question |
|---|---|
| P126.8 | Are off-chip components (network taps, analog sensors) technically feasible at scale against top-tier adversaries? |
| P126.9 | What is the actual readiness of unpublished work (the MVP consensus whose specifics are TBA; redacted projects)? |
| P126.10 | Have the proposed solutions to prevent-escape and prevent-acquisition been finalised, with implementation details and reduced cost? |
| P126.11 | Has prior work said how to verifiably regulate AI development and deployment? |
Possibly relevant work found by automated search
Not searched: no technical result was expected for this problem.
Data
- problems.csv — one row per problem
- problem_status.csv — status, scope and evidence per problem
- problem_sources.csv — the posed-by quote and other documents per problem
- leaves.csv — all sub-questions, including those without a checkable form
- leaf_sources.csv — every source row behind each sub-question